

## RELATION OF CURRENT PLANS AND POSTURE TO PROPOSED REQUIREMENTS

### 1. Survival and endurance.

(a) The current force cannot survive in major strength under well-coordinated enemy attack without quick reaction to tactical warnings which is ambiguous and unreliable. Only the small Polaris force can endure under prolonged attack, and no current/protected capability exists to control it. (Airborne alert is a current potential, and preparation could extend the ~~xxxxxxx~~ interval during which planes/on positive control could await commitment).

(b) No current strategic plans provide for a strategic reserve under any circumstances of central war; all ready vehicles, including all Polaris missiles, are committed to attack preplanned targets as soon as possible.

### 2. Strict positive control.

(a) There are currently no realistic procedures for the authorization of a strategic response by high national authority in the event of a surprise attack destroying Washington. All duly constituted officials authorized to assume succession as Commander-in-Chief are normally located in Washington. *Insert from next page.*

(b) In the absence of realistic plans or convincing assurance that authorization for an appropriate response will be forthcoming, there is <sup>with</sup> widespread acceptance of the notion that unauthorized <sup>"initiative"</sup> ~~response~~ will be necessary, either at high military levels of command (which are almost ~~equally~~ vulnerable as Washington) or at low. Both this attitude itself, and the reluctance to institute reliable safeguards against unauthorized action which follows from it, increase the possibility of unauthorized "initiative" in a time of crisis, under the stress of ambiguous indications and an outage of communications with higher command.

(c) Although there are physical safeguards against accident, there are almost none against unauthorized action, either in connection

with individual vehicles or in command post operations. Such safeguards are technically possible; in principle, they take the form of a combination lock on weapons, requiring a code sent by higher authority to unsafe or release the weapon.

(c) Such safeguards are particularly important in connection with weapons under dual control with an Ally; current "protection", furnished by the Ally itself, serves to guard against "third party" action but furnishes minimum inhibition against unilateral action by Allied forces themselves.

(d) "Super-safing" both against accident and unauthorized action is required for weapons on high alert or mobile. Currently, weapons on high alert with Allied forces, nominally under dual control, not only lack such special precautions but are atypically accident-prone, not having been designed for such operation.

~~(e) National security demands assurance of an authorized and effective response under all conditions of enemy attack~~

(f) It would be unacceptable to lower the ~~max~~ risk of accident at the cost of markedly raising the risk of deliberate enemy attack; solutions to the problems of accident and unauthorized action should not afford an enemy the opportunity to paralyze U.S. response totally by attack on the command and control system. Even a

moderate attack on the U.S. command and control system today would eliminate, with high confidence, the possibility of a U.S. authorized or even coordinated response.

Although the design of explicit procedures for authorization under all circumstances raises complicated issues, such procedures could be both safer and more reliable than current tacit, ambiguous and uncontrolled understandings.

## Information

3. (a) Current plans (prior to the President's Budget message) do not call for bomb alarm read-outs at ~~ix~~ offensive force bases or subordinate command posts. Many units, particularly outside the ZI, might have outage of communications as their only immediate indication of enemy attack, and that would be highly ambiguous.

(b) The current design of the bomb alarm system, including means of transmission of signals, is such that a small number of bombs might put it out of operation. Thus, even though it had indicated that an attack involving "at least," say, three four bombs had taken place, it would not be able to indicate even grossly the actual size of the attack, its nature (e.g., whether or not cities were being hit on a large scale), or its gross effects on U.S. bases; nor could it discriminate reliably ~~xxxxxx~~ between a large-scale, coordinated attack and an attack involving a few weapons, possibly as a result of unauthorized action or nth country action.

(c) Almost all information, status-reporting, intelligence, sensor and reconnaissance/<sup>systems</sup> are either totally unprotected or vulnerable in vital links; inputs of data to surviving decision-makers would drop almost to zero at the outset of a major attack.

(d) The bomb alarm system as currently planned does not link different levels of in the chain of command. No other highly reliable means of determining the status of higher command are currently provided; ~~xxxxxxx~~  
reliance is upon outage of communications, which is highly ambiguous.

4. Force flexibility.

(a) Current design of Minuteman missiles makes it impossible to fire fewer than 50 at a time.

(b) Current design of Minuteman missiles requires procedures which may take six hours to change the target of a missile from its the one preset. If commitment within a few ~~xxx~~ minutes or hours is required, the currently planned Minuteman force could be used only in blocs of 50 against preplanned targets.

c) Current plans do not include options for covering alternative target systems; in the absence of such plans, rapid retargeting of large numbers of bombers is almost impossible, even before attack. x No protected facilities, or planning aids for rapid replanning, would allow such retargeting after attack.

d) The almost total <sup>current</sup> lack of preparation for post-attack reconnaissance with ~~protected read-outs and command facilities~~, would severely limit the possibility of <sup>(after initial attack)</sup> countermilitary action, ~~after initial attack on known military targets.~~ <sup>even against soft, fixed missiles relying only on concealment for protection.</sup>

##### 5. Countermilitary capability.

(a) Lacking flexibility and the capability for rapid replanning just prior to or during attack, current countermilitary ~~and~~ forces would have little ability ~~to adapt to~~ exploit actual inefficiencies or vulnerabilities in Soviet posture or tactics; in any case, they lack the protected information sources necessary to recognize such Soviet departures from conservative U.S. expectations.

(b) Even if U.S. countermilitary action were able markedly to reduce the weight of attack that the Soviets could launch against the U.S., other aspects of U.S. posture combine to ensure that even a small Soviet attack would be maximally potent;

1) The basing of U.S. bombers, missiles, ~~and~~ carriers and Polaris submarines near major U.S. or Allied cities currently makes those cities "bonus" targets in a Soviet attack on U.S. forces. But the current plans for siting new missiles near or upwind of U.S. cities gratuitously adds to this problem. <sup>They decrease the force requirement by a</sup> ~~substantial margin, attack against both forces and US population, and they increase the~~ <sup>is a significant factor in the decision to attack US forces alone.</sup>

2) Anti-bomber defenses current operate in highly vulnerable, centralized modes, and the defensive vehicles themselves are unprotected. The possible effectiveness of anti-missile defenses is still under

(3) The <sup>current</sup> ~~lack of~~ <sup>adequate</sup> ~~fallout~~ protection in the U.S. means that even a very small attack--a large unauthorized Soviet action, or an attack by a minor power, an aborted attack or one heavily attrited by U.S. countermilitary action--would cause very heavy U.S. casualties, even if the attack hit no major U.S. cities directly. Thus, measures proposed to reduce the likelihood of a large enemy attack, and especially a large attack against cities, could not ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ lower U.S. casualties below an extremely large figure ~~xxxx~~ even under a relatively small attack.

~~xxxxxx~~

6. Contingency planning.

- a) Current "alternative" options provide only for differing force size and coordination of attack upon a single, given target system, corresponding to different intervals of warning. ~~they~~ Even in the attack on this system, they do not provide for different patterns of U.S. base destruction in a surprise attack. They do not allow attack of alternative target ~~xxxx~~ systems, or <sup>deliberate</sup> postponement of attack on any part of the given target system.
- b) No current option provides for the avoidance or postponement of attack on major Soviet or Communist Chinese cities.
- c) No current option ~~xxxx~~ provides for minimizing non-military casualties <sup>in the U.S.S.R. or Communist China</sup> / subject to the military requirements of ~~xxxx~~ strictly counterforce operations.
- d) No current option provides for the maintenance of ready forces (e.g., Polaris submarines) in strategic reserve.
- e) No current option provides for the exclusion of <sup>primary</sup> / governmental control centers, or primary military control centers, from initial attack.
- f) No current option covers war with the Soviet Union alone, excluding or postponing attacks upon Communist China.

There is the  
a GRC.

g) The exclusion of one or more satellite nations from <sup>planned</sup> attacks would require procedures taking several hours to complete. no!

h) Neither joint strategic plans, nor supporting plans, have normally been submitted to the President or to the Secretary of Defense for their inspection, review or approval; although nominally all ~~such~~ directives to the unified and specified commanders are issued by authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense or the Commander-in-Chief.

7. Protected command

a) See 2(a).

b) A single bomb on Washington would seriously degrade military command capability, but it would virtually eliminate all ~~existing~~ constituted political authority and all experienced, <sup>fully</sup> ~~currently~~ informed political leadership. Such an explosion might be the result of accident, unauthorized action, nth country action, or badly executed or abortive enemy attack: all ~~events~~ ~~may~~ putting the utmost premium on information, ~~and~~ experience <sup>and authority</sup> both political and military.

c)

c) The possibility of precluding authorization of a response, and thereby possibly paralyzing or at least delaying a coordinated U.S. response, by hitting a few soft or semi-soft/~~command posts~~ in the US makes those centers ~~targetxxxxxxxhighxxxxxxx~~ overwhelmingly attractive targets. ~~Unless a highly reliable back-up system assured an enemy of an effective response under all circumstances, he would probably be willing to pay even a very high cost (e.g., large numbers of large-yield missiles, xxxxx armed reconnaissance by bombers, difficult sabotage techniques) to destroy them. But under current circumstances, the cost of destroying them is so low that even a small promise of reward--~~

d) If the cost of destroying U.S. primary command centers could be sharply raised, and the rewards to hitting them sharply lowered or even made negative (by assuring a maximal retaliatory response), the enemy would be forced, at the least, to reconsider the desirability of attacking them.

d) Before 1961, plans for protection of primary leadership depended almost entirely on warning~~xxxx~~ and relocation; yet the alternate relocation sites ~~xxxx~~ offer highly inadequate protection. There was, in effect, "no place to hide," even with warning. (Current plans for mobile sites should improve this situation).

#### 8. Wartime control

a) ~~Currently, if the President xxxxxx survived under attack andxxxxxxxforcedxxx~~

a) See 6a-g.

b) Once an authenticated "Execute" order has been received by SAC forces; SAC operational doctrine--and their lack of an authentication code for a "Stop" order--prevents them from being stopped by any authority.

c) Since all current strategic options destroy all major Sino-Soviet urban-industrial centers and governmental/military control centers, and none maintains a strategic reserve, U.S. ~~political~~ *political*